Advisory ID: DUO-PSA-2017-002
Publication Date: 2017-05-31
Revision Date: 2017-05-31
Status: Confirmed, Fixed
Document Revision: 1
Duo Security has identified an issue in duo_unix, which, under certain uncommon configurations, could enable attackers to bypass second-factor user authentication. Duo has no evidence that this vulnerability has actively been exploited and we believe this specific configuration is extraordinarily uncommon.
This issue was resolved in version 1.9.21 of duo_unix. Customers using an affected configuration should update to the latest version as soon as possible (see "Solution" section below).
Prior to version 1.9.21, duo_unix (which includes both login_duo and pam_duo), supported setting an HTTP proxy configuration through the standard 'http_proxy' environment variable. Under some uncommon configurations (examples listed below), however, it is possible for an untrusted user to set a value for the 'http_proxy' variable prior to initiating a Duo authentication attempt.
If an invalid proxy host (e.g. '0.0.0.0') is selected, then login_duo/pam_duo will ultimately fail to connect to Duo's API, and as a result, trigger the configured "failmode" behavior. If "failmode" is set to "safe" (which is the default), then this could result in a bypass of second-factor authentication.
Duo has identified two specific configuration scenarios in which an untrusted user may be able to control the value of the 'http_proxy' environment variable.
OpenSSH can permit clients to forward environment variables to servers. By default, OpenSSH server distributions generally allow only a whitelisted set of variables (which does not include 'http_proxy') to be forwarded in this way. It is possible, however, for an administrator to configure a less-restrictive policy using the AcceptEnv keyword in sshd_config.
If a server has been configured with a non-default AcceptEnv policy that permits clients to send an 'http_proxy' environment variable, and is using login_duo to add Duo 2FA to ssh logins, then this configuration could result in a bypass of Duo 2FA.
This scenario only applies to login_duo; when used with OpenSSH, pam_duo is unaffected by this issue.
While pam_duo is not affected by this issue when used with OpenSSH, when pam_duo is being used to perform 2FA in other contexts - particularly, to authenticate system-local actions performed by untrusted users - it may be possible for untrusted users to control the value of the 'http_proxy' environment variable prior to initiating an authentication attempt.
In particular, Duo has confirmed that configurations which use pam_duo to add Duo 2FA to the "su" and "sudo" commands are impacted by this issue.
Version 1.9.21 of duo_unix has been released to resolve this issue. It removes support for configuring an HTTP Proxy via an environment variable.
Attackers may be able to bypass second-factor authentication on impacted configurations which accept attacker-controlled environment variables.
All versions of duo_unix prior to 1.9.21 are impacted when used in one of the following configuration scenarios:
Customers using login_duo in an affected configuration may work around this issue by ensuring that their AcceptEnv configuration for sshd (e.g. in /etc/ssh/sshd_config) does not permit clients to send an 'http_proxy' variable.
Customers using pam_duo in an affected configuration must upgrade to the latest version of duo_unix.
Customers should upgrade to the latest version of the duo_unix client as discussed above. Clone the latest version from:
For more information on upgrading duo_unix, see https://duo.com/docs/duounix
Vulnerability Class: CWE-454: External Initialization of Trusted Variables or Data Stores
Remotely Exploitable: No
Authentication Required: Partial
CVSSv2 Overall Score: 5.0
CVSSv2 Group Scores: Base: 6.0, Temporal: 5.0
CVSSv2 Vector: (AV:L/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:F/RL:OF/RC:C)
Technical questions regarding this issue should be sent to firstname.lastname@example.org and reference "DUO-PSA-2017-002" in the subject, or to your Customer Success Manager, if appropriate.
Duo Security would like to thank Fred Emmott for reporting this issue.